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CLARITY AT SENTENCING
DEFERRED: HOW DORSEY V.
UNITED STATES COULD HAVE
REFORMED FEDERAL
SENTENCING
JONATHAN ROSS
I. INTRODUCTION
1

In Dorsey v. United States, the Supreme Court held that
Congress’s recent revision to the Controlled Substances Act should
apply even when a defendant committed an offense before the
2
statutory change was enacted. The Court’s conclusion was in line with
prevailing public sentiment. The Court’s legal analysis, however, was
ad hoc and is likely to leave lower courts construing other ambiguous
federal sentencing provisions uncertain as to how to apply Dorsey
3
outside of its precise context. This is problematic because ambiguities
frequently arise in sentencing provisions. Federal sentencing is
complex and consists of a web of interconnected sources of and
constraints on judicial authority. Moreover, the stakes at sentencing
hearings, for defendants, the government, and the public alike, are
high and implicate significant social values—personal freedom versus
societal order. Thus, not only are sentencing provisions inherently
ambiguous, but resolving such ambiguities often entails making policy
choices. The Supreme Court has not given lower courts generally
applicable guidance on how to resolve ambiguous sentencing
provisions, and Congress often leaves particular policy matters
unaddressed. As a result, sentencing courts all too often employ the
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1. 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012).
2. Id. at 2335.
3. Id. at 2344 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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sort of ad hoc analysis used by the Court in Dorsey.
This article explains Dorsey and demonstrates the pitfalls of the
outcome-oriented approach that the Dorsey Court used. It then offers
an alternative means of construing ambiguous sentencing
provisions—giving judicial deference to some executive branch
interpretations of ambiguous sentencing provisions. It argues that
deference to the Attorney General is not necessarily appropriate in
all cases. However, when the Attorney General interprets a
sentencing provision in a lenient manner, such that prosecutors and
defendants agree as to what a provision means and how it applies,
courts should not interject their own, independently derived
constructions. This proposed rule would provide a generally
applicable framework for resolving sentencing ambiguities and would
ensure that policy decisions are left to politically accountable
branches.
II. THE PROBLEM: AMBIGUOUS SENTENCING PROVISIONS, DORSEY,
AND THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH
When a federal district court imposes a criminal sentence, it does
so pursuant to various sources of authority, including non-statutory
4
5
judicial power, generally applicable federal sentencing provisions,
the advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines (Sentencing
Guidelines), which are issued by the United States Sentencing
Commission (Sentencing Commission) and authorized by federal
6
statute, and various offense-specific statutes that set maximum and
7
minimum penalties for certain offenses. The ways that these sources

4. See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 440 & n.14 (1974) (noting the broad
discretion of trial judges in imposing sentences); see also Nancy Gertner, A Short History of
American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too Much Law, or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 691, 695–96 (2010) (noting that appellate review of sentences is extremely
limited and a trial judge’s authority is “virtually unquestioned”).
5. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.); see also Gertner, supra note 4, at 698–99; Stanley A.
Weigel, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Practical Appraisal, 36 UCLA L. REV. 83, 83–86
(1988) (providing background information on the enactment of the complex statutory and
regulatory scheme created by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984).
6. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2012); 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(a)(1) (West
2012).
7. E.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c) (West 2012) (authorizing additional penalties for certain
crimes when a firearm is used in its commission); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(b) (West 2012)
(authorizing special penalties for possession of child pornography); see generally Erik Luna &
Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2010) (providing general
background information on the rise of mandatory minimum sentencing and offering suggestions
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of authority are intended to relate to each other is often unclear. As a
result, a court must often resolve a thorny question of statutory
interpretation during a sentencing hearing.
Dorsey provides an example of these difficulties and also
demonstrates the way in which the Supreme Court often resolves
ambiguous sentencing provisions—by focusing its attention on the
policy questions implicated by these ambiguities. In Dorsey, the Court
construed Congress’s most recent change to title 18, section 841(b),
the provision setting the mandatory minimum and maximum
penalties for cocaine offenses. Originally enacted as part of the
Controlled Substances Act, from 1986 until 2010 the statute provided
8
the same penalty for one gram of cocaine base (crack) as it provided
9
for one hundred grams of powder cocaine. Although not required by
statute, to achieve uniformity, the Sentencing Commission used the
10
same ratio when it developed guidelines for cocaine offenses. Shortly
after its creation, the ratio was widely condemned. Its critics noted
that it had no empirical basis and that its application had a disparate
11
impact on African Americans.
In 2010, Congress acquiesced to the calls for the 100:1 ratio’s
12
replacement when it enacted the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA). In the
13
legislation, Congress replaced the 100:1 ratio with an 18:1 ratio.
Congress also granted the Sentencing Commission “emergency
authority” to enact new guidelines reflecting the changed ratio and
14
ordered it to do so within ninety days. The President signed the FSA

for reform consistent with a minimalist approach to statutory modification).
8. As discussed infra, the Court recently held that the statutory term “cocaine base”
includes crack cocaine but also refers to other substances. See DePierre v. United States, 131 S.
Ct. 2225, 2231–33 (2011) (holding that the term “cocaine base,” as used in federal drug statutes,
is not just crack cocaine but also cocaine in its chemically basic form). However, for simplicity,
this article treats “crack cocaine” and “cocaine base” as synonymous, unless otherwise stated.
9. 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b) (West 2012); Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)).
10. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c) (1987); Kimbrough v. United
States, 552 U.S. 85, 96–97 (2007).
11. The history of the crack/powder ratio and the academic, administrative, and judicial
criticisms of the ratio have been well documented in Supreme Court opinions and scholarly
articles. E.g., Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2327–30; Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 94–101;
Jacob Loshin, Beyond the Clash of Disparities: Cocaine Sentencing After Booker, 29 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 619, 628–39 (2007); William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards A
Rational Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1233, 1245–57 (1996).
12. Fair Sentencing Act, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010) (codified in scattered
sections of 21 and 28 U.S.C.).
13. Id.; Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2329; Luna & Cassell, supra note 7, at 4–6.
14. Fair Sentencing Act § 8(2).
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on August 3, 2010, and it was immediately effective. On October 27,
15
2010, the Sentencing Commission issued these new guidelines. The
changes to the guidelines became effective on November 1, 2010, and
courts applied the new guidelines in all sentencing hearings occurring
16
on or after that date.
Soon thereafter, first district and then circuit courts divided over
whether the statutory change applied in all sentencing hearings
occurring after August 3, 2010. Courts that held that it did not apply
noted that the statute was silent on the issue. In the face of such
silence, title 1, section 109, the savings statute, provides that a change
in a sentencing provision does not apply when a defendant committed
17
all or part of his offense prior to the date of enactment. Courts that
held that the FSA did apply noted that the savings statute could be
impliedly repealed and that Congress’s sense of urgency in enacting
the FSA demonstrated that Congress did not intend for courts to
18
continue applying the old ratio after the date of enactment. These
courts also emphasized that Congress’s instruction to the Sentencing
Commission, as well as congressional awareness that the new
guidelines would become effective immediately, indicated that
Congress intended for the new statute to become immediately
19
effective as well, regardless of when an offense occurred.
The Justice Department’s original position in these cases was that
courts must apply the pre-FSA version of the statute when offense
20
conduct occurred before enactment. On November 17, 2010, Senator

15. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 75 Fed. Reg. 66188-02 (October 27,
2010).
16. Id.; see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii) (West 2012) (requiring sentencing courts to
apply the guidelines “in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced”).
17. E.g., United States v. Fisher, 635 F.3d 336, 338–39 (7th Cir. 2011); see also 1 U.S.C.A. §
109 (West 2012) (“The repeal of any statue shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any
penalty . . . incurred under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall so expressly
provide . . . .”).
18. A district judge in Maine was the first to reach this conclusion. See generally United
States v. Douglas, 746 F. Supp. 2d 220 (D. Me. 2010) (holding that the new mandatory
sentencing floors under the FSA apply to a defendant who engaged in crack cocaine trafficking
and pleaded guilty before the statutory reform). He was then followed by several other district
courts. E.g., United States v. Whitfield, Criminal No. 2:10CR13, 2010 WL 5387701, at *1–2
(N.D. Miss. Dec. 21, 2010); United States v. Cox, No. 10-cr-85-wmc, 2011 WL 92071, at *2–3
(W.D. Wisc. Jan. 11, 2011); United States v. Watts, 775 F. Supp. 2d 263, 273, 281 (D. Mass.
2011). The First Circuit then upheld the district court’s decision in United States v. Douglas, 644
F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2011).
19. Douglas, 644 F.3d at 41.
20. Memorandum from Acting Deputy Attorney General Gary G. Grindler to All Federal
Prosecutors (Aug. 5, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/docs/fair-sentencing-act-
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Dick Durbin, one of the Senate bill’s sponsors, and Senator Patrick J.
Leahy sent a letter to Attorney General Eric Holder expressing their
21
frustration with the Administration’s position. On April 25, 2011,
Acting Assistant Attorney General Mark D. Agrast, on behalf of the
22
Attorney General, responded to the Senators’ letter. In the
meantime, the media noticed the Administration’s seemingly odd
23
position. Major newspapers called on the Justice Department to
24
alter its position so as to promote justice and fairness. Others
published news stories depicting the unfairness of the continued
25
application of the old penalties.
After months of continuing to advocate for the old ratio’s viability,
the Attorney General heeded the calls for reform. On July 15, 2011,
Attorney General Holder issued a memorandum to all federal
prosecutors in which he acknowledged the judicial confusion, stated
that he had freshly considered the issue, and announced that the
26
Justice Department had reversed its official position.
After receiving the memorandum, prosecutors presented the
Justice Department’s changed position to a number of appellate
27
courts. However, most of these courts did not give weight to the
prosecutors’ new arguments. For example, in a Seventh Circuit case,
Judge Frank Easterbrook wrote that the Attorney General’s

memo.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2012).
21. See Letter from Sen. Dick Durbin and Sen. Patrick J. Leahy to Attorney General Eric
H. Holder (Nov. 17, 2010), available at http://sentencing.typepad.com/files/fair-sentencing-actag-holder-letter-111710.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2012) (stating that “the [FSA’s] reduced crack
penalties should apply to defendants whose conduct predates enactment of the legislation but
who have not yet been sentenced”).
22. Letter from Acting Assistant Attorney General Mark D. Agrast to Sen. Dick Durbin
and
Sen.
Patrick
J.
Leahy
(Apr.
25,
2011),
available
at
http://sentencing.typepad.com/files/fsa_holder_letter_response_042511.pdf (last visited Nov. 17,
2012).
23. On December 21, 2010, the Wall Street Journal became the first major media outlet to
report the mounting standoff between Congress, the Administration, and a slightly fractured
Judiciary. See Gary Fields, Crack Sentences Still Tough, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2010, at A3.
24. E.g., Editorial, The Drug Sentencing Discrepancy, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2011, at A20;
25. E.g., Gary Fields, Crack Sentences Still Tough, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2010, at A3;
Editorial, Multiple Inequities, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2011, at A24; Editorial, Fairness in Cocaine
Sentences, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 13, 2011, at 10A.
26. See Memorandum from Attorney General Eric H. Holder to All Federal Prosecutors
(July
15,
2011)
[hereinafter
“Holder
Memorandum”],
available
at
http://sentencing.typepad.com/files/holder-fsa-memo-7.15.11.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2012).
27. E.g., Brief of United States, Petition for Rehearing En Banc, United States v. Sidney,
No. 11-1216 (8th Cir. 2011); Gov’t Notice of Changed Position, United States v. Holcomb, 657
F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11-1588, 11-1559, 11-1586, 11-1758); Supplemental Brief of United
States, United States v. Tickles, 661 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-30852).
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memorandum, which the judge viewed as a mere statement of policy
devoid of legal analysis, was insufficient to justify en banc review of
28
circuit precedent. This changed on November 28, 2010, when the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Dorsey and another Seventh
29
Circuit case that raised the issue. The Court consolidated the cases
and appointed counsel to argue in support of the Seventh Circuit’s
opinions. Subsequently, the Government filed a brief supporting the
petitioners, individuals who committed crack cocaine offenses before
30
the FSA’s enactment but who were sentenced subsequently.
In the opinion that followed, Justice Breyer, on behalf of a five-tofour majority, sought to resolve the narrow statutory issue; however,
he made little effort to conceal the policy concerns that animated his
31
analysis. The Court sided with the petitioners and the Government
by looking to “background principles” against which Congress
32
intended courts to view the FSA. Justice Breyer began by citing
indicia that Congress had intended to repeal the savings statute by
33
implication. The Court then held that affirming the lower court
34
would result in significant and unwarranted sentencing disparities.
Although Justice Breyer did not hide the fact that he considered it
imprudent to create these disparities, he was able to link these
principles to the statutory admonition that sentencing courts should
35
avoid “unwarranted sentencing disparities.” However, for the final
principle, Justice Breyer made no effort at statutory rooting. Instead,
he simply held that “we have found no strong countervailing
36
consideration.” Thus, the majority concluded that applying the
savings statute would make for bad policy—absent some affirmative
indication that Congress intended to create such bad policy, the Court

28. United States v. Holcomb, 657 F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 2011) (reh’g en banc denied)
(Easterbrook, J.).
29. Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 759 (2011); Hill v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 759
(2011).
30. See generally Brief for the United States Supporting Petitioners, Dorsey v. United
States, Hill v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012) (Nos. 11-5683, 11-5721) (arguing that the
FSA applies to all initial sentencing procedures that occurred after its enactment).
31. See Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2328–29 (noting that the criticism concerning the 100-to-1
mandatory minimum ratio from the law enforcement community and the Sentencing
Commission led Congress to adjust the ratio lower through enactment of the FSA after an
emergency recommendation from the Sentencing Commission).
32. Id. at 2326.
33. Id. at 2330–32.
34. Id. at 2335.
35. Id. at 2333 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(b)(1)(B) (West 2012)).
36. Id. at 2335.
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declined to create it on its own.
Other recent sentencing cases counseled against the Court’s
turning to the background principles that it found so compelling in
Dorsey. First, the Dorsey Court treated the savings statute, a protector
of a sentencing court’s non-statutory authority, as a weak
37
presumption. However, in another recent case, the Court held that,
to withdraw a sentencing court’s non-statutory authority, Congress
38
must do so explicitly. Next, Justice Breyer concluded that Congress
intended for the Sentencing Guidelines and statutory provisions to
operate in tandem. This conclusion contravenes the Court’s
pronouncements in other recent sentencing cases, where the Court
was content to acknowledge that sentencing statutes and the
39
Sentencing Guidelines serve different purposes. Finally, the Dorsey
majority was troubled greatly by the sentencing disparities that would
have resulted if the FSA and the savings statute were strictly
construed. However, in other cases, the Court has held that when
sentencing disparities result from the plain language of a statute
enacted after Congress instructed courts to avoid “unwarranted
40
sentencing disparities,” such disparities are not “unwarranted.”

37. The savings statute preserves a sentencing court’s non-statutory power by requiring
Congress to explicitly declare its desire to abrogate such power by requiring sentencing courts to
apply a new statute in pending cases. See Harold J. Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between
Criminal and Civil Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2172 (1996) (discussing the fact
that Congress has overridden the Supreme Court’s presumption that pending criminal
prosecutions are abated once a criminal statute is repealed); see also Warden v. Marrero, 417
U.S. 653, 660 (1974) (expounding on the history of the savings statute and holding that its
purpose was to prevent the common-law abatement of affected prosecutions when there was
subsequently passed legislation that affected the penalties, liabilities, or forfeiture of the original
prosecutions). Admittedly, Dorsey involved the replacement of one statute with another statute.
Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 759. However, the Court would have likely reached the same result had the
100:1 ratio been a judicial construct.
38. See Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1469 (2012) (holding that a sentencing
court enjoys the power to order that a sentence be served consecutive to a not-yet-imposed but
anticipated sentence, even though Congress had not explicitly granted sentencing courts such
authority and congressional silence suggested an intent to withdraw this traditional power from
sentencing courts).
39. See, e.g., DePierre v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2225, 2236–37 (2011) (holding that the
Sentencing Commission’s definition of “cocaine base” for the purposes of the Sentencing
Guidelines was not instructive as to Congress’s intended meaning of “cocaine base” in 18 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(B)(iii)).
40. See, e.g., Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1248–49 (2011) (holding that the
disparities likely to result from courts, pursuant to statute, considering evidence of postconviction rehabilitation were not unwarranted); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 106–
09 (2007) (holding that disparities likely to result from the mandatory minimum provision were
not unwarranted).
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III. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION: DEFERENCE TO THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL AT SENTENCING
Dorsey presented a conundrum for the Court. When it enacted the
FSA, Congress created a statutory ambiguity. The relevant legal
principles strongly suggested an outcome that was contrary to the
policy choice that motivated Congress to pass the FSA in the first
place. The Court, therefore, had to craft a weak legal argument in
order to ensure that it furthered Congress’s (and the majority’s own)
policy view. Because the Court’s analysis in Dorsey did not comport
with its approaches in other sentencing cases, Dorsey likely will cause
confusion among lower courts applying Dorsey in other sentencing
contexts. This is especially troubling in a complicated area of the law
like sentencing, where the stakes are high and ambiguities often arise.
The following argues an alternative way that the Court could have
resolved the issue in Dorsey—by deferring, pursuant to an established
judicial deference doctrine, to the interpretation offered by the
executive branch. The Court’s doing so would have left policymaking
to a policymaking branch and would have provided lower courts
going forward with a generally applicable method of resolving
ambiguities in sentencing provisions.
A. Judicial Deference and the Proposed Rule
Judicial deference is a bedrock concept of administrative law.
Generally, when an agency charged with administering a statute
interprets the statute, the agency interpretation is entitled to special
consideration by a court. If Congress authorized the agency to use
formal procedures to issue legally binding interpretations, the agency
interpretation, so long as it is reasonable, is entitled to automatic
deference pursuant to Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
41
Council. When the agency interpretation results from less formalized
41. 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see United States v. Mead Corp., 553 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (holding
that a reasonable agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute is entitled to judicial
deference). Chevron and its progeny have been the subject of numerous scholarly articles. See
generally, e.g., David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP.
CT. REV. 201 (expounding on the level of judicial deference due to agency heads as compared to
low-level agency officials in the context of Chevron); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman,
Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001) (discussing the expansion of judicial deference to
agency interpretations of statutes in the wake of Chevron and its progeny); Antonin Scalia,
Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511. In Chevron, the
Court announced a now familiar two-step procedure for determining when mandatory
deference applies. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
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procedures and is not binding on regulated parties, a court should give
the interpretation special consideration short of automatic deference
42
pursuant to Skidmore v. Swift & Co. The Court has previously
declined to give deference to the Attorney General’s interpretations
43
of ambiguous substantive criminal statutes. Nevertheless, the Court
has applied Chevron deference to the Justice Department’s
interpretations of provisions related to criminal law and sentencing
when the Court has found evidence of a congressional delegation to
44
the Justice Department. Accordingly, the rule proposed by this
article is not barred by existing precedent, although it would
967, 986 (2005) (“At the first step, we ask whether the statute’s plain terms directly addresses
the precise question at issue. If the statute is ambiguous on the point, we defer at step two to the
agency’s interpretation so long as the construction is a reasonable policy choice for the agency
to make.” (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted)).
42. 323 U.S. 134 (1944); see St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451
U.S. 772, 783 n.13 (1981) (“The amount of deference due an administrative agency’s
interpretation of a statute, however, will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 237 (1974)
(“We have recognized previously that the weight of an administrative interpretation will
depend, among other things, upon its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements of an
agency.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 93–94
(1973) (holding that Skidmore deference has limits when the agency’s interpretation is
inconsistent with obvious congressional intent).
43. See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 177 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The
Justice Department, of course, has a very specific responsibility to determine for itself what the
statute means, in order to decide when to prosecute; but we have never thought that the
interpretation of those charged with prosecuting criminal statutes is entitled to deference.”).
44. The Court routinely defers to the Attorney General’s interpretations of ambiguous
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and its predecessor provisions. See
INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 414, 424–25 (1999) (“Based on this allocation of authority . . .
the BIA should be accorded Chevron deference as it gives ambiguous statutory terms concrete
meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication . . . .” (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)); see also Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 516–17 (2009) (holding that the
Attorney General’s rulings with respect to the INA are due Chevron deference by the courts);
INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 29–32 (1996) (holding that the INS’s interpretation was
entitled to deference unless it was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion); INS v.
Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988). The Court defers despite proceedings under the INA being
considered “quasi-criminal.” See Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 577 (1884) (Field,
J., dissenting) (noting that the Court had no power to change the requirements necessary for
Chinese laborers to enter the country under the Chinese Restriction Act, even though the Act
was quasi-criminal in nature); see also Johnson v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 164, 172 n.10 (2d Cir. 2004)
(“The difficulty is that removal proceedings, though involving matters that are quasi-criminal,
have been deemed civil.”). Additionally, Chevron deference applies to the Bureau of Prisons’s
interpretations of provisions addressing federal incarceration. See Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50,
60–61 (1995) (holding that the interpretation by the Bureau of Prisons’s agency guideline was
entitled to Chevron deference because it was a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous
statute); see also Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 240 (2001) (affirming that the interpretation of
the statute denying early release by the Bureau of Prisons was entitled to Chevron deference).
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constitute a leap from the Court’s previous cases.
This deference proposal is not entirely novel. Professor Dan
Kahan urges the Court to announce a rule requiring federal courts to
defer to the Attorney General’s interpretations of all ambiguous
45
substantive federal criminal statutes. Kahan’s proposal is overbroad
and would, as Justice Scalia warned when confronted with a similar
argument, “turn the normal construction of criminal statutes upside
46
down, replacing the doctrine of lenity with a doctrine of severity.”
Nevertheless, the rationales for the deference doctrines that are most
frequently articulated by courts support a limited and modified
version of Kahan’s thesis. Deference has a role to play at the
sentencing phase of a criminal case, even if it does not have such a
role to play at the adjudicative phase.
1. The Implied Delegation Rationale
The implied delegation rationale states that when Congress leaves
an ambiguity in an agency-administered statute, Congress assumes
that the agency will resolve the ambiguity. Thus, such an ambiguity is
47
an implied delegation of Congress’s lawmaking power to the agency.
The Chevron Court acknowledged that its decision rested at least in
48
part on this justification, and the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed
49
the rationale’s importance.

45. Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV.
469, 488–90 (1996).
46. Crandon, 494 U.S. at 177 (Scalia, J., concurring).
47. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L.
REV. 363, 368–70 (1986) (noting that agency expertise gives rise to an implied congressional
directive from Congress for the courts to defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation); Scalia,
supra note 41, at 516–18 (“An ambiguity in a statute committed to agency implementation can
be attributed to either of two congressional desires: (1) Congress intended a particular result,
but was not clear about it or (2) Congress had no particular intent on the subject, but meant to
leave its resolution to the agency.”).
48. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(“Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather
than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”).
49. See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704,
713–14 (2011) (“Our inquiry [into whether there is Chevron deference] does not turn on
whether Congress’s delegation of authority was general or specific.”); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546
U.S. 243, 255–56 (2006) (holding that there is Chevron deference even if Congress has delegated
authority to the agency generally); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001)
(holding that the lack of express delegation from Congress does not prohibit agency
interpretation of ambiguous statutes). Looking for an implied delegation is the primary means
of determining whether Skidmore or Chevron deference applies. However, Congress might
charge an agency with interpreting a statute and yet not intend that the agency be responsible
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Kahan argues that when Congress passes a vague criminal statute,
prosecutors and courts share the power to resolve the statutory
50
ambiguity. Because prosecutors can choose who to prosecute, under
what statutes to bring cases, and what legal theories to press on courts,
51
prosecutors play important roles in shaping federal criminal law. The
Justice Department’s power to use prosecutorial discretion to shape
sentencing law is even more substantial than its power to shape
substantive criminal law. Thus, Congress delegates to the Attorney
General some authority to craft sentencing law, while also delegating
authority to courts.
Sentencing-related delegation can be viewed in three specific
ways. First, statutory maximum and mandatory minimum provisions
ensure that, at the charging phase, a prosecutor makes decisions that
substantially dictate the sentence that a defendant will receive if
52
convicted. Likewise, prosecutors play a significant role in crafting a
for resolving ambiguities in the statute. In such a case, an agency interpretation should not be
accorded Chevron deference. Barron & Kagan, supra note 41, at 216–18. Nevertheless,
Congress likely legislates with Skidmore in mind and is aware that an agency interpretation will
be accorded at least some deference by a court. A court then can consider a statutory ambiguity
as Congress’s impliedly granting an agency authority to render an interpretation that, while not
binding, is nevertheless owed deference. Accordingly, indicia of a congressional delegation to an
agency to interpret a statute can support Skidmore, as well as Chevron, deference.
50. Kahan, supra note 45, at 479–81. Kahan characterizes federal criminal law as “a system
of delegated common law-making.” Id. at 479. He cites the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961–1968 (West 2012), various fraud statutes, 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 371, 1341, 1343 (West 2012), the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA), 18
U.S.C.A. § 2314 (West 2012), and the federal theft statute, U.S.C.A. 18 § 641 (West 2012), as
examples of vague federal statutes subject to federal common lawmaking. See Kahan, supra
note 45, at 472–79.
51. Id. at 479–80.
52. See, e.g., Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 WASH. L. REV. 69,
93 (2011) (“Where mandatory minimum sentences exist, the discretionary charging decision
essentially controls what sentence a particular defendant will receive.”); Michael A. Simons,
Prosecutors as Punishment Theorists: Seeking Sentencing Justice, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 303,
351 (2009) (“As the system stands now, prosecutors effectively impose the sentence by choosing
to file (or choosing not to file) sentencing enhancements.”); see generally David Bjerk, Making
the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion Under Mandatory Minimum
Sentencing, 48 J.L. & ECON. 591 (2005); Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion in the
Shadow of Advisory Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums, 19 TEMPLE POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
REV. 377 (2010). For example, a prosecutor decides at the charging phase of a drug trafficking
case the quantity of drugs to allege. The amount that the prosecutor alleges dictates the
statutory penalties to which the defendant is subject upon conviction, regardless of the drug
quantity that the court believes was actually involved in an offense. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)
(West 2012); see also United States v. Sanders, 668 F.3d 1298, 1310 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that
18 U.S.C. § 841(b) required no proof of the defendant’s mens rea and only required proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense involved a particular quantity of the drug charged in
the indictment); United States v. Graham, 317 F.3d 262, 273–74 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that
sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 841(b) is based on the quantity of drugs charged in the indictment
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defendant’s sentencing guideline range. Although the United States
Probation Office (Probation), an arm of the Judiciary, is charged with
gathering evidence relevant to calculating a defendant’s guideline
53
range, Probation is seldom able to do this work independently.
Instead, it relies on information provided by the Justice Department
to determine a defendant’s offense level and whether certain
54
enhancements apply. Thus, a prosecutor’s decision about what
evidence to provide to Probation, and what evidence to withhold,
55
directly influences a defendant’s sentence. Finally, a prosecutor can
dictate a defendant’s guideline range in more direct ways. Section
5K1.1 of the guidelines allows a court to reduce a defendant’s offense
level based on a defendant’s assistance to the government in an
ongoing investigation; however, the court is only able to do so upon
56
motion from the government. An implied delegation could have
supported the Court’s applying deference in Dorsey. Although
Congress changed the crack/powder ratio when it enacted the FSA, it
left in place a prosecutor’s authority to determine at the charging
stage whether a mandatory minimum will apply at sentencing, and if
so, what that mandatory minimum will be.
2. The Political Accountability Rationale
The Chevron Court acknowledged that, in some instances, a
statute’s drafting history will be inconclusive as to whether Congress

and proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt); United States v. Aguayo-Delgado,
220 F.3d 926, 933 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that if the prosecution wants to seek penalties in
excess of the elements of the offense alone, it must charge the facts in the indictment and prove
them beyond a reasonable doubt).
53. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.
54. See William J. Powell & Michael T. Cimino, Prosecutorial Discretion Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: Is the Fox Guarding the Hen House?, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 373, 383 n.55
(1995) (“It should be clear that while the probation office is intended to act independently on
behalf of the court, the reality is that probation offices have neither the resources nor the
training to conduct independent investigations prior to sentencing, and rely upon Assistant
United States Attorneys to provide sentencing information.”); see also Kate Stith, The Arc of
the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1449–50
(2008) (expounding that, because there is no possible way for the Justice Department to review
and control every charging decision and plea agreement made by Assistant United States
Attorneys, they are afforded a wide level of discretion).
55. See Powell & Cimino, supra note 54, at 382–95 (noting that the nature of sentencing in
this country gives the prosecutor wide discretion on influencing the kind of offenses with which
defendants are charged and the length of sentences they eventually receive).
56. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2012); see Powell & Cimino, supra
note 54, at 390–92 (noting that it is at the prosecutor’s discretion whether or not to move for a
departure under 5K1.1); see also Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors
in Discretionary Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1511, 1523–25 (2000).
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intended to delegate interpretive authority to the executive branch.
Nevertheless, deference may be appropriate in such cases where
resolving a statutory ambiguity requires making a policy judgment.
The Chevron Court concluded that “[i]n such a case, federal judges—
who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy
57
choices made by those who do.” The argument then follows that if
Congress, when enacting an agency-administered statute, does not
resolve a policy issue implicated by the statute, courts should defer to
58
the politically accountable agency’s resolution of the matter.
Professor David Barron and then-Professor Elena Kagan argue
that a search for congressional intent is usually futile—Congress
seldom anticipates the interpretive issues that will arise when an
59
agency administers a statute. Thus, they contend that this political
60
accountability rationale best explains the deference doctrines.
Whether rooted in the constitutional doctrine of separation of
61
62
powers, or merely in prudent judicial practice, most commentators
agree that when the Executive has spoken about a policy matter
related to an agency-administered statute, courts should pause before
casting aside the Executive’s opinion.
How long a person convicted of a federal crime spends
incarcerated for her offense is undoubtedly an important matter of
national policy. For the past three decades, the executive and
legislative branches have devoted considerable resources to
discussing and reforming the country’s sentencing laws. Public opinion
63
about these issues almost certainly has shaped the debate. When an
57. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
58. See id. (holding that only the political branches, not the Judiciary, have the
responsibility to resolve conflicts between policy viewpoints).
59. See Barron & Kagan, supra note 41, at 223 (“Congress’s view on deference (were
Congress to consider the matter) likely would hinge on numerous case-specific and agencyspecific variables, not readily susceptible to judicial understanding or analysis.”)
60. See id. at 235–36, 241 (reasoning that Chevron deference should only apply to agency
decisions when the official originally named in Congress’s delegation of authority personally
assumes responsibility for the decision because such limitation of deference promotes political
accountability and disciplined decision making).
61. E.g., Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG.
283, 308–09 (1986) (arguing that the Constitution does not grant courts supervisory powers over
agencies, therefore courts should voluntarily avoid intrusions into the decisions of the political
branches).
62. E.g., Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to Agency Interpretations of
Statutes?: A New Doctrinal Basis for Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
1991 WISC. L. REV. 1275, 1289 (arguing that the Court in Chevron was motivated by a theory of
prudential self-restraint).
63. See, e.g., PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, PUBLIC OPINION ON SENTENCING AND
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ambiguity arises in a sentencing provision, the resolution of the
ambiguity bears directly on the possible prison sentences faced by a
class of defendants. Thus, when a court construes an ambiguous
sentencing provision, it necessarily makes policy and does so without
a constituency holding it accountable—one of the evils that the
Chevron Court sought to redress. By giving deference to the Attorney
General in matters of sentencing, a court would allow a political
branch to resolve a political issue.
However, just as the political accountability rationale supports the
proposed rule, it also limits it. Barron and Kagan contend that
Chevron deference should only apply to statutory interpretations that
reflect official agency policy and that are sanctioned by the agency
64
head. While agency heads are likely to mold their judgments to fit
prevailing political views, career officials within agencies are less
likely to do so and are more likely to be beholden to special interest
65
groups with whom they repeatedly interact. Thus, if Chevron
deference serves to ensure that policy decisions are made by
politically accountable actors, and agency heads are the politically
accountable actors within agencies, then Chevron deference should
66
only be given to their decrees. Accordingly, courts should only give
deference when the Attorney General speaks about a sentencing
provision.
In Dorsey, instead of cobbling together a shaky legal basis for a
policy position that it happened to share with the Attorney General,
the Court could have acknowledged that the Attorney General’s
opinion was informed by public will and then given deference to that
opinion. The Government’s position in Dorsey is a classic example of
an agency position molded by the political process. Congress enacted

CORRECTIONS
POLICY
IN
AMERICA
(2012),
available
at
http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2012/PEW_NationalSurveyResearchPaper
_FINAL.pdf. (last visited Nov. 18, 2012) (concluding that support for sentencing reform is
strong among many major voting demographics).
64. See Barron & Kagan, supra note 41, at 235–36 (advocating giving Skidmore deference
to statutory interpretations rendered by lower-level agency officials).
65. Id. at 242–43.
66. See id. (“It is only the presence of high-level agency officials that makes plausible
Chevron’s claimed connection between agencies and the public; and it is only the involvement
of these officials in decision making that makes possible the kind of political accountability that
Chevron viewed as compelling deference.”). For similar reasons, Kahan envisions courts only
giving deference to the Attorney General’s interpretations of criminal statutes. He argues that
individual prosecutors’ policy judgments are often colored by self-interest and that this selfinterest often leads to prosecutorial overreaching. Kahan, supra note 45, at 496–500.
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the FSA after years of public condemnation of the old ratio. Members
of Congress, the media, and lower court judges then pointed out that
the Justice Department’s original position did not comport with the
motivation for Congress’s action. Their doing so prompted the
Attorney General to intervene. The Dorsey Court could have noted
that the Attorney General had offered a plausible legal argument to
support the prevailing wisdom of the political branches and thus left
its hands clean of the policy-driven analysis for which the Attorney
General, as a politically accountable member of government, is better
suited.
3. The Agency Expertise Rationale
An agency’s expertise with a statute that it administers is the
67
primary justification for applying Skidmore deference. Moreover,
agency expertise is at least a secondary justification for applying
68
Chevron deference. Kahan argues that the Justice Department’s
expertise in interpreting and applying federal criminal statutes, and
the fact that “the experience of individual judges (particularly at the
appellate level) with criminal law remains limited and sporadic,”
combine to support deferring to the Attorney General’s
69
interpretations of criminal statutes. This argument gives short shrift
to judges’ expertise in interpreting and applying substantive criminal
law. However, when it comes to sentencing provisions, the Justice
Department has, in the aggregate, greater expertise than the Judiciary.
This is because most criminal cases require only that federal judges
become “experts” in interpreting and applying the substantive
elements of the drug trafficking statutes of title 21, the firearm
70
provisions of title 18, and the immigration provisions of title 8. Not

67. See Barron & Kagan, supra note 41, at 223–25.
68. See Pension Benefits Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651–52 (1990)
(“[P]ractical agency expertise is one of the principle justifications behind Chevron deference.”);
Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 771, 782
(2002) (“If factors such as . . . agency expertise have persuasive force in a Skidmore context,
they should have like force when a court is applying the first step of Chevron.”); Merrill &
Hickman, supra note 41, at 862 (“[T]he goal of resolving statutory ambiguities in such a way as
to further the purposes of the statute is increasingly becoming a task beyond the grasp of
generalist judges. . . . [D]eference to agency interpretations may thus be necessary . . . to make
law internally coherent.”).
69. Kahan, supra note 45, at 485, 488–89.
70. In fiscal year 2011, 73.2% of all federal prosecutions fell into one of these three general
categories. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FY 2011 SOURCEBOOK, FIG. A, OFFENDERS IN EACH
PRIMARY OFFENSE CATEGORY (depicting the portion of offenders categorized as
“Immigration” (34.9%), “Drugs” (29.1%), and “Firearms” (9.2%)).
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surprisingly, federal courts are also quite often required to apply the
penalty provisions associated with these statutes. However, while
Congress seldom modifies the portions of section 841 (the drug
trafficking statute), section 922 (the general firearm statute), or title 8,
section 1326 (the illegal reentry statute) that set forth substantive
offense elements, the accompanying penalty provisions are often
71
subject to congressional amendment. As a result, while a federal
judge’s expertise with substantive criminal law is often lasting, her
expertise with sentencing provisions is often rendered moot by
Congress’s shifting prerogatives. A court’s crowded docket might
mean that it will take a judge considerable time to fully acquaint
herself with all aspects of a new sentencing provision. Conversely, the
prevalence of plea bargaining in federal prosecutions results in a
sentencing hearing being the part of a prosecution that requires the
72
most preparation by a prosecutor. Thus, a prosecutor must quickly
become an expert in interpreting and applying a new federal
sentencing provision.
Moreover, the Justice Department has sufficient institutional
73
resources to empirically study and evaluate federal sentencing. The
Justice Department’s empirical knowledge of the effectiveness of
incarceration likely informs the types of sentences for which it
71. Congress has not amended the substantive part of the drug trafficking statute, 21
U.S.C. § 841(a), since it originally enacted the provision. However, Congress has modified 21
U.S.C. § 841(b), the penalty provision, repeatedly during the same period. Since 1986, Congress
has modified the provision ten times. See Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986); Pub. L. No.
100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988); Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (1990); Pub. L. No. 103-322,
108 Stat. 1796 (1994); Pub. L. No. 104-305, 110 Stat. 3807 (1996); Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat.
2681 (1998); Pub. L. No. 106-172, 114 Stat. 7 (2000); Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002);
Pub. L. No. 110-425, 122 Stat. 4820 (2008); Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010). Congress
last made a substantive change to the provision setting forth the elements of federal firearms
offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 922, in 1994. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994). Since then,
Congress has made substantive changes to the statute providing penalties for firearms offenses,
18 U.S.C. § 924, on four separate occasions. See Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (1996); Pub.
L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469 (1998); Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002); Pub. L. No.
109-92, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005). Finally, Congress has not made substantive changes to the illegal
reentry statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1326, since originally enacting it in 1952. However, Congress has
modified the penalties for illegal reentry three times since 1990. See Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104
Stat. 4978 (1990); Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994); Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009
(1996).
72. In fiscal year 2011, 96.9% of all federal cases ended in guilty pleas. U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, FY 2011 SOURCEBOOK, FIG. C, GUILTY PLEAS AND TRIAL RATES (depicting guilty
plea and trial rates for fiscal years 2007 to 2011).
73. For example, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, a sub-agency within the Justice
Department, annually compiles and publishes numerous reports on topics like recidivism and
incarceration rates. Similarly, the Bureau of Prisons frequently evaluates and reports on
recidivism and the effectiveness of various prison treatment and training programs.
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advocates, and the constructions of sentencing statutes that it offers in
support of its advocacy. For example, an internal report on cocaine
74
sentencing likely influenced the Government’s position in Dorsey.
This fact, standing alone, supports deference to the Justice
Department’s interpretations of sentencing provisions. There is more,
though. The Justice Department prepares these reports at the
75
direction of Congress. Congress directs the Justice Department to
empirically study federal sentencing—thus, one could reason that
Congress intends for courts to defer to the Justice Department’s
76
interpretations of sentencing provisions.
4. The Uniformity and Consistency Rationale
Finally, deference ensures uniformity in the construction and
77
administration of highly technical statutes. The limited number of
cases that the Supreme Court hears annually and the highly technical
nature of agency-administered statutes make it almost certain that,
without deference doctrines, many circuits would split over how best
to interpret such provisions. By making an agency interpretation of an
ambiguous provision immediately binding, deference bestows
uniformity-related benefits on all interested parties. Deference allows
an agency to administer a statute confident as to what the provision
means and how it applies. Deference allows regulated parties to
conform their actions to the statute’s requirements, as uniformly
construed by the agency. Deference also furthers the democratic
74. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL COCAINE OFFENSES: AN ANALYSIS OF CRACK
POWDER
PENALTIES
(2002),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/olp/pdf/crack_powder2002.pdf (analyzing how facial disparities between
powder and crack cocaine sentencing guidelines play out in actual sentences).
75. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 3732 (West 2012) (establishing the Bureau of Justice Statistics
and charging it with completing certain reporting duties); 18 U.S.C.A. § 4047 (West 2012) (“Any
submission of legislation . . . which could increase or decrease the number of persons
incarcerated in Federal penal institutions shall be accompanied by a prison impact statement
[prepared by the Attorney General in consultation with the Sentencing Commission and the
Administrative Office of the Courts].”).
76. Courts hold that Congress’s explicitly instructing an agency to study an issue and
prepare a report supports the assumption that Congress intends for courts to defer to an agency
interpretation of a statute addressing the issue when the agency bases its interpretation on its
empirical study. E.g., Allied Local & Reg’l Mfrs. Caucus v. EPA, 215 F.3d 61, 72–73 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (“[W]e must be particularly deferential . . . where Congress—by instructing [an agency] to
set priorities using multiple, nondeterminative [sic] criteria—HAS NECESSARILY indicated
an intention to delegate substantial discretion to the agency.” (emphasis in original)).
77. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred-Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1093, 1126 (1987) (arguing that the Court defers to agencies, therefore reducing the role of
lower courts, partially to promote uniformity and effective enforcement).
AND
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process. If an agency interpretation is immediately binding, and
Congress is not satisfied with the agency’s work, it can promptly act to
supersede the agency. Finally, deference, at least in theory, benefits
78
courts by conserving judicial resources.
All parties interested in a sentencing hearing would benefit from
the uniformity that the proposed rule would engender. A defendant
would be able to make a decision about how to plead fully informed
of the likely penalties. So too would a prosecutor be informed, even
before charging a defendant. The democratic process would be served
by ensuring that Congress knows, as soon as the Attorney General
speaks, how an ambiguous sentencing provision will be construed and
applied. If Congress is dissatisfied with the Attorney General’s
reading, it would have an impetus to act, without waiting on the
tedious process of Supreme Court review. Finally, the Judiciary would
benefit. Not only would district and circuit courts not have to waste
resources construing ambiguous sentencing provisions, but district
courts would also be spared from the painstaking process of
resentencing defendants when higher courts subsequently disagree
79
with the district courts’ interpretations.
B. The Specifics of the Proposed Rule
1. Only Lenient Statutory Interpretations?
Although there is good reason for courts giving deference to the
Attorney General’s interpretations of some ambiguous sentencing
provisions, courts need not give deference to all such interpretations.
Sentencing courts should only apply a deference doctrine when the
Attorney General interprets an ambiguous provision in a manner that
results in a class of defendants being subject to lesser penalties than
the defendants would be subject to based on any plausible alternative

78. See id. at 1095 (suggesting that the Court’s resource dilemmas might have influenced it
to accept the broad standpoint on deference introduced by Chevron). Other scholars counter
that applying Chevron step one is as arduous as independently construing a statute, and that
deference therefore does not conserve judicial resources. E.g., Jack M. Beerman, End the Failed
Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Avoided, 42
CONN. L. REV. 779, 850–51 (2010).
79. Since deciding Dorsey, the Court has remanded forty-three pending cases for further
consideration in light of Dorsey. E.g., Davis v. United States, No. 11-5323 (U.S. June 29, 2012);
Sidney v. United States, No. 11-8134 (U.S. June 29, 2012); Strowder v. United States, No. 118413 (U.S. June 29, 2012). This figure reflects only the pre-enactment FSA cases that had made
it to the certiorari petition stage when the Court decided Dorsey. Undoubtedly, Dorsey remands
will crowd district courts’ dockets for the immediate future.
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reading of the provision. In short, deference should only apply when
the Attorney General interprets a sentencing provision in the most
80
lenient manner. There are four reasons for this requirement.
First, this limitation moderates the novelty of the proposed rule.
At first glance, it appears that adopting this deference rule would
require the Judiciary to cede a considerable amount of power to the
executive branch. However, if deference applies only to lenient
interpretations of sentencing provisions, then applying deference, as a
functional matter, does not give the executive branch power that it
does not already enjoy. Since the Constitution was ratified, the
President has enjoyed near plenary authority to pardon or commute a
81
sentence. The Court long ago recognized that clemency is based on
the principle that legal effect should be given to the President’s
determination “that the public welfare will be better served by
82
inflicting less [punishment] than what the judgment fixed.” When the
Attorney General endorses, and a court then adopts out of deference,
a lenient interpretation of a sentencing provision, the same outcome
results as would have followed if the President had commuted the
sentences of a class of defendants after determining that the
defendants’ sentencing courts should have applied a provision in a
lenient manner. In both instances, defendants receive shorter
sentences due to the executive branch making a policy judgment
about a sentencing provision. For example, had the Dorsey dissenters
prevailed, the President could have subsequently commuted the
sentences of all individuals sentenced under the old ratio after August

80. This requirement forces a court to consider whether the Attorney General’s
interpretation is the most lenient of all plausible interpretations. The government might ask the
court to apply the proposed rule even when the Attorney General’s position and the
defendant’s position do not align. The government might characterize its interpretation as the
most lenient interpretation that is plausible, and the defendant’s interpretation, although
resulting in even less punishment, as not legally defensible. In such a case, the court would have
to resolve the dispute. However, courts are experienced in identifying statutory interpretations
that are and are not “fairly possible.” See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (“When the
validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question . . . it is a cardinal principle that this Court
will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided.”).
81. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“The President . . . shall have Power to grant Reprieves
and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.”); United
States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 159–60 (1833) (“A pardon . . . proceed[s] from the power
intrusted [sic] with the execution of the laws.”); see generally William F. Duker, The President’s
Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475 (1977) (advocating
adoption of a constitutional amendment “to rid the pardoning power of its apprehensible
novelty.”).
82. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927).
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3, 2010. The President’s doing so would have nullified the Court’s
decision, and would have rendered the extensive litigation on the
issue moot. However, the Administration’s policy position, first
embodied in the Attorney General’s memorandum, would have been
implemented. Had the Dorsey Court deferred to the Attorney
General’s position, it would have efficiently implemented executive
branch policy. By independently resolving the issue, the Court left
open the possibility that the President would be forced to implement
83
the Administration’s chosen policy after the Court spoke.
Second, this limitation ensures that courts apply the proposed rule
in ways that are most consistent with the political accountability and
agency expertise rationales. The government’s default position in most
84
prosecutions is to advocate for the harshest punishment available.
Thus, when the Attorney General interprets an ambiguous sentencing
provision in a manner that subjects a class of defendants to the
harshest possible punishment, his doing so might be in response to
national consensus on a policy issue or to an empirical study; however,
it is just as likely that his doing so is nothing more than an example of
the government’s common practice of seeking to punish offenders
severely. When the Attorney General retreats from this default
position, and asks courts to construe a sentencing provision in a
85
lenient way, he probably has a compelling reason for doing so.

83. Professors Jack Goldsmith and John Manning argue that the President has broad
power to choose the means of carrying into effect a legislative scheme. Jack Goldsmith & John
F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280, 2282 (2006). They contend
that courts should not review the President’s exercise of this “completion power” so long as
Congress has not articulated specific means that the President should use to achieve an end, so
long as the Constitution does not vest in Congress exclusive authority to dictate such means, and
so long as deferring to the President’s chosen means does not upset long-standing balances of
power between the President and the Judiciary. Id. at 2308–11. Congress has made the purposes
of federal sentencing statutes clear in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) and has entrusted the Executive with
achieving those ends. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2012) (listing factors to be considered
when imposing a sentence).
84. See Kahan, supra note 45, at 486–87 (arguing that prosecutorial overreach may result
from systems that incentivize high conviction rates). Many scholars have considered whether
prosecutors are most likely to be motivated by a quest for justice or by some other goal, like a
high conviction rate or a defendant receiving a harsh punishment. These scholars have generally
reached the latter conclusion. See Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making:
Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1589–90 (2006) (describing
how the majority of literature on the subject assigns different values to prosecutorial decisions
than simply a search for justice).
85. Specifically, prosecutorial leniency likely results from either prevailing popular will or
empirical study. See discussion of Dorsey, supra Part II (explaining that when there has been a
change in the legislation, differences in sentencing are to be expected).
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Third, this limitation prevents sentencing courts from applying the
proposed rule in a way that conflicts with the rule of lenity. The rule of
lenity applies when courts construe sentencing provisions, and it
requires that sentencing courts not read a statute in a way that
increases the penalties to which a defendant is subject when the court
could plausibly read the statute in a way that results in lesser
86
penalties. Thus, adopting a rule that requires sentencing courts to
defer to the Attorney General’s reading of an ambiguous sentencing
provision when the Attorney General and defendants offer differing
87
readings would run afoul of this rule. However, by limiting deference
to lenient interpretations, the proposed rule becomes an extension of
the rule of lenity. The rule of lenity is rooted in part in the principle of
legislative supremacy—when Congress does not make clear its desire
88
to impose punishment, a court should not step in and do so. More
broadly, the rule of lenity, like the deference doctrines, requires that
courts not tread in areas best left to the politically accountable
89
branches. Deference to only lenient interpretations ensures that
when one political branch (the Executive) determines that a certain
type of punishment should not be applied, and the other political
branch (Congress) acquiesces to that determination by failing to act,
courts will not step in and impose punishment in contravention of the
political branches’ wishes.

86. See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 342 (1981) (“This policy of lenity means
that the Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it
places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than guesses as to
what Congress intended.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). See generally Phillip M. Spector,
The Sentencing Rule of Lenity, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 511, 531–65 (2002) (discussing the principles
of the rule of lenity in the sentencing context).
87. More broadly, several scholars have noted that the rule of lenity is violated when a
court gives Chevron deference to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute that allows
for criminal penalties. See Elliot Greenfield, A Lenity Exception to Chevron Deference, 58
BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 38–61 (2006) (arguing that the rule of lenity can displace Chevron
deference); Kristen E. Hickman, Of Lenity, Chevron, and KPMG, 26 VA. TAX REV. 905, 912–17
(2007) (arguing that the rule of lenity is in opposition to Chevron deference).
88. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347–48 (1971) (holding that the rule of lenity is
based in part on the principle that the seriousness of criminal prosecutions dictates that
“legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity”); see also United States v.
Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95–96 (1820) (“[T]hough penal laws are to be construed
strictly, they are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the
legislature.”).
89. See Note, Justifying the Chevron Doctrine: Insights from the Rule of Lenity, 123 HARV.
L. REV. 2043, 2059–63 (2010) (arguing that Chevron deference constitutes the extension of the
rule of lenity into areas of administrative law).
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Finally, this limitation prevents sentencing courts from applying
the proposed deference doctrine in a way that violates the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee of due process. It is settled that a criminal
defendant enjoys some due process rights at sentencing, although
such rights are less comprehensive than those that he enjoyed at the
90
adjudicative phase. Among the rights applicable at sentencing is the
right to make legal arguments about the pertinent sentencing
91
provisions. Accordingly, applying the proposed rule when the
government and the defendant are not in general agreement about a
legal issue would effectively withdraw from the defendant this due
92
process right. However, when the government and the defendant
generally agree about a statutory or guideline issue, then the court can
apply the deference rule and assume that the defendant impliedly
waived his right to be heard on the issue.
2. What Level of Deference Should Sentencing Courts Apply?
The next task is to determine just what level of deference a
sentencing court should give to the Attorney General’s lenient

90. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 84–85 (1986) (explaining that the defendant
retains due process rights during sentencing); see also Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559,
564 (1984) (affirming that some of the defendant’s due process rights extend to the sentencing
proceedings); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (holding that due process may be
different in certain situations).
91. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 343–44 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(explaining that defendants have an additional right to be heard in the sentencing process); see
also FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (allotting to a defendant, in relevant section (i), the right to be heard
by the court on matters relating to sentencing proceedings).
92. See Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process of
Administrative Lawmaking, 46 GA. L. REV. 117, 193–97 (2011) (arguing that Mead establishes
that Chevron deference should only be given to agency interpretations of statutes when such
interpretations follow from procedures that serve to vindicate regulated parties’ due process
rights). Similarly, the Court has indicated, and lower courts have held, that deference is not
owed when an agency interpretation of a statute withdraws from a regulated party a
constitutional right. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 204–05 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(arguing that administrative agency regulations must be interpreted in a way as to afford their
constitutionality rather than disregarding constitutional rights); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.
Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574–75 (1988) (declining to apply
Chevron when the agency’s interpretation of a statute risked infringing on labor union
members’ First Amendment rights); United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 705 (4th Cir. 2003)
(holding that when an administrative regulation reflects the limits of constitutional
Congressional power, it is to be narrowly read unless there is a specific indication from Congress
that it meant for it to be read broadly); Williams v. Babbit, 115 F.3d 657, 661–63 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that when an administrative regulation raises serious constitutional issues, it will be
read narrowly in order to protect constitutional rights). The imposition of a criminal sentence
results in the defendant losing constitutional rights. Thus, when the defendant does not
acquiesce to the Attorney General’s opinion as to how long he should lose his rights, a court
should not give deference.
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interpretations of ambiguous sentencing provisions. The deference
doctrines do not support sentencing courts’ giving automatic
deference pursuant to Chevron. However, the doctrines do support
sentencing courts applying a robust version of the Skidmore doctrine.
93
First, United States v. Mead establishes that Chevron deference
applies only when the agency received from Congress the power to
94
promulgate rules having the force of law. Although Congress has
given prosecutors a large role at sentencing, courts actually impose
sentences. Thus, the Justice Department cannot make sentencingrelated statements that have the force of law. Second, the Mead Court
also emphasized that the formality of the processes that produce an
agency interpretation dictate the level of deference that a court
95
should apply to the interpretation. When an agency uses informal
96
procedures, Skidmore deference is appropriate. Kahan notes that the
Attorney General does not have the statutory authorization to
develop statutory interpretations through notice and comment
97
rulemaking or formal adjudications. Instead, the interpretations to
which courts should give deference will likely be developed
informally and will take the form of directives from the Attorney
General to his employees. Third, Chevron deference is required by
either statute or the Constitution, whereas Skidmore deference
reflects courts’ voluntary cession of some judicial authority to the
98
Executive for prudential reasons. Neither the Constitution nor any
statute requires the proposed rule; instead, the policy reasons for
giving deference suggest it. Fourth, to the extent that the implied
delegation rationale supports deference at sentencing, it only supports
Skidmore deference. As explained, Congress delegated to both the
courts and to the Justice Department the power to construe and apply
sentencing provisions. Merrill and Hickman argue that when
93. 553 U.S. 218 (2001).
94. Id. at 227.
95. Id. at 228.
96. Id. at 234–38; see Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261,
283–84 (2009) (“The Memorandum, though not subject to sufficiently formal procedures to
merit Chevron deference . . . .”).
97. Kahan, supra note 45, at 519.
98. See generally Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” is Too Confusing—Let’s Call them
“Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight”, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1144 (2012). Strauss
characterizes “Chevron space” as “the area within which an administrative agency has been
statutorily empowered to act in a manner that creates legal obligations or constraints—that is,
its delegated or allocated authority.” Id. at 1145. He describes “Skidmore weight” as “the
possibility that an agency’s view on a given statutory question may in itself warrant respect by
judges.” Id.
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Congress entrusts multiple agencies with the enforcement of a single
provision, it intends for courts to give the agencies’ interpretations
99
Skidmore deference.
Although Chevron deference is not appropriate, the proposed rule
would nevertheless reform the current way that courts decipher
ambiguous sentencing provisions. One could currently argue that
when a court considers the government’s brief filed in support of a
defendant’s sentencing argument, it gives the government’s position
Skidmore deference. However, Skidmore deference at sentencing
should entail more.
Commentators have long grappled with just what Skidmore
deference is. They have generally come to agree that Skidmore
deference requires giving an agency special consideration not given to
100
other litigants based solely on the agency’s status. Skidmore
deference at sentencing should reflect this general agreement. A
sentencing court should first ask whether a provision is in fact
ambiguous. If there are sufficient indicia of Congress’s intent, then the
inquiry should end and the court should give effect to Congress’s
101
intended meaning. If the statute is ambiguous, and the Attorney

99. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 41, at 895–96 (arguing that in the case of conflict,
courts should give deference to the interpretation most likely to persuade); see also Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 478–80 (1999) (acknowledging that three agencies jointly
administered the ADA, but holding that a determination of the deference owed to one agency’s
interpretation was not necessary to deciding the case).
100. Professor Kristin E. Hickman and Matthew D. Krueger argue that, when it applies
Skidmore deference, a court should first ask whether an agency interpretation reflects the
agency’s expertise, or whether it reflects arbitrary action. If the interpretation is rooted solely in
expertise, then a court should be highly deferential; if it is plainly arbitrary, then the court
should award no deference; and if there are indicia of both expertise and arbitrariness, then the
court should apply an intermediate level of deference. Such intermediate deference should
cause a court to pause before displacing an agency interpretation with one of its own so long as
the agency, during litigation, can offer a reasoned basis for its interpretation. Kristin E.
Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 1235, 1294–99 (2007). Similarly, Professor Jim Rossi contends that Skidmore deference
should be identical to Chevron deference, except that at step two of the analysis, a court
applying Skidmore deference should be more exacting in asking whether the agency’s
interpretation is reasonable. Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within
the Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105, 1138–46 (2001). Finally, a recent
commentator contends that a court applying Skidmore deference should treat an agency
interpretation in the same way that it would treat nonbinding precedent from a sister circuit—it
should give it respect and be reluctant to depart from it absent good reason for doing so.
Bradley Lipton, Note, Accountability, Deference, and the Skidmore Doctrine, 119 YALE L.J.
2096, 2133–34 (2010).
101. Scholars generally agree that Skidmore deference includes such a step one inquiry. See
Hickman & Krueger, supra note 100, at 1280 (“[S]kidmore deference exclude[s] cases in which
the court found the statute clear or unambiguous.”); Rossi, supra note 100, at 1139 (“Skidmore

ROSS (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

12/20/2012 2:35 AM

CLARITY AT SENTENCING DEFERRED

103

General has proffered a lenient interpretation, then the sentencing
court should apply a presumption of validity to the Attorney
General’s interpretation.
The court should, however, consider sua sponte whether any of the
102
following Skidmore factors defeats the presumption. The court
should ask first whether substantial empirical evidence counsels
against the Attorney General’s interpretation. The court might
consider whether the Attorney General reached his opinion without
considering an important study, or by relying on flawed data. Next, the
court should consider whether the Attorney General’s position
appears to be arbitrary or inconsistent with earlier pronouncements.
In asking this question, the court should be careful to distinguish
between the Attorney General’s pronouncements and the arguments
made by individual prosecutors. A court should not deny the Attorney
General’s position deference merely because line prosecutors
advanced the opposing argument before the Attorney General spoke.
However, if the Attorney General has repeatedly changed his official
position on an issue, or if his interpretation is merely advisory and not
official Justice Department policy, then such facts might counsel
103
against applying deference. Finally, the court should ask whether the
legal basis for the Attorney General’s position is fundamentally
flawed. In asking this question, the court should be careful not to
compare the Attorney General’s reasoning with the court’s own legal
analysis. The court should merely seek to ensure that the Attorney
General’s position is not foreclosed by binding precedent and at least
reasonably follows from the statute and existing case law. So long as
there is a plausible legal basis for the Attorney General’s position, the
court need not be troubled if it finds that the Attorney General was
motivated by policy considerations in crafting his argument. Upon
finding any one of these factors strongly present, or a combination of
these factors moderately present, the court should treat the
presumption of validity defeated and then independently consider the
statutory issue. Otherwise, the court should adopt the Attorney
General’s position without ever considering the legal issue on its own.
or Chevron deference issues arise only when the statute is silent or ambiguous.”).
102. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (explaining that even when
administrative interpretations are not “reached by trial in adversary form” they still deserve
deference).
103. A court should, nevertheless, excuse a change in official Justice Department policy
when it results from a change in presidential administrations. The court might even excuse such
a change when it results from the appointment and confirmation of a new Attorney General.
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3. What Procedures are Required for Deference to Apply?
To receive deference, the Attorney General should be required to
make his statutory interpretation publicly available in a published
document that is prepared and released independent of any single
104
case. This requirement stems from the administrative-law rule that
deference is not owed to “agency litigating positions that are wholly
105
unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice.”
The requirement also serves various practical purposes. First, it
allows a court giving deference to rest assured that it is deferring to
uniform Justice Department policy, and not to a case-specific litigating
position. Because sentencing ambiguities are likely to arise in a large
number of factually similar cases, if a sentencing court were asked to
defer to the government’s brief alone, it would impose a heavy burden
on the court to scour other courts’ dockets where the same issue had
arisen to ensure that the position to which it was deferring was
actually uniform Justice Department policy and not merely a casespecific argument. However, if the government’s position is backed by
an independent policy statement from the Attorney General, then
sentencing courts need not go to such lengths. Second, the
requirement guarantees that sentencing courts are only deferring to
the politically accountable agency head, the Attorney General, and
106
not to lower-level agency officials.
Third, the requirement ensures that the Attorney General’s
statements are subjected to public scrutiny without preventing the
Attorney General from efficiently administering the Justice
Department. It would be relatively easy for the government to file the
same brief advancing a lenient interpretation in a class of cases
without calling attention to its doing so. In cases involving issues as
notable and frequently debated as the new crack/powder cocaine
ratio, observant court watchers would probably notice the
government’s actions. However, in cases involving more technical
issues that are not in the public eye, the government might be able to
104. The Attorney General could release such interpretations in publications like the
Federal Register or the United States Attorneys Manual, regulations prepared by the Office of
Legal Policy, or in publicly available memoranda.
105. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988); see United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (explaining that the degree of deference given to
administrative interpretation varies according to circumstances that give it “power to
persuade”).
106. See Barron & Kagan, supra note 41, at 238–39 (“Only when an interpretation bears the
name of the statutory delegatee has she adopted it as her own.”).
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file such briefs and draw the attention only of informed members of
the bar. In such cases, sentencing courts would not be able to assume
that the government’s position had been publicly vetted. The
publication requirement remedies this problem. When the Attorney
General publicly releases an interpretation, it will likely be examined
107
and scrutinized. If it is left unchanged and then included in Justice
Department briefs and litigation memoranda, sentencing courts can
confidently assume that the interpretation has been subjected to
public scrutiny.
The Attorney General’s published statement should make clear
the precise class of cases in which the Attorney General intends for
his interpretation to apply, the specifics of the interpretation, the legal
basis for the position, and the empirical and policy bases for the
position. In short, the statement should include enough for a
sentencing court to know when to give deference, and to begin to
108
consider whether the presumption of validity has been defeated.
However, a sentencing court considering whether to give deference
should not be limited to analyzing the Attorney General’s statement.
Instead, the court should be allowed to consider a brief or
memorandum advancing the position, so long as the Attorney
General’s statement satisfies these basic requirements, and the
litigation statement does not break new ground or advance wholly
new arguments.
C. Imagining Deference in Dorsey
Dorsey could have been the moment when the Court articulated
and first applied a deference rule like the one proposed here. Initially,
the disagreement among lower courts on the issue strongly suggests
that the FSA is ambiguous as to whether it applies in all post-August
3, 2010, sentencing hearings. The Government took the position that
the FSA should apply in all post-August 3, 2010, sentencing hearings,
regardless of when a defendant committed his offense. The petitioners

107. Such post-publication scrutiny is sufficient, and notice and comment rulemaking would
be far too onerous a requirement to impose. If notice and comment rulemaking were required,
it seems unlikely that the Attorney General would ever go to such trouble, and thus would be
deterred from advancing lenient interpretations. Kahan makes a similar argument regarding his
proposed deference standard. See Kahan, supra note 45, at 519–20 (“Courts shouldn’t defer to
readings embodied in internal memoranda and briefs, however, for these interpretations are too
low-profile to ensure notice and political accountability.”).
108. Cf. id. at 515–18 (arguing that deference should only be applied to statements of the
Attorney General that reflect “reasoned decisionmaking”).
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and the Government were in agreement on this point, and it does not
appear that there is a plausible alternative reading of the FSA that
would have resulted in the petitioners receiving less punishment.
Thus, the Government’s position was lenient. The Government’s
lenient litigation position in Dorsey (and in the array of similar cases
where the issue arose) was dictated by the Attorney General’s
interpretation of the FSA. The Attorney General issued this
interpretation in the form of a signed and publicly released
memorandum. In the memorandum, the Attorney General stated that
his legal opinion applied only in the cases of defendants sentenced for
cocaine-related offenses under section 841(b) after August 3, 2010; his
opinion was that the version of section 841(b) to be applied at such
sentencing hearings was the version as amended by the FSA, that the
district and circuit courts’ views in Douglas formed the legal basis for
his opinion, and that “the serious impact on the criminal justice
system of continuing to impose unfair penalties” was the policy
109
consideration that prompted him to act. Judge Easterbrook was
correct in noting that the Attorney General left questions unanswered
110
in his memorandum. However, the Attorney General provided
sufficient information in the memorandum for the Court to begin to
perform a Skidmore analysis. The Government’s brief filed in Dorsey
provides answers for questions left unanswered by the Attorney
111
General. Thus, the Government’s brief could also have informed the
deference review. The Government’s lenient interpretation of the
FSA, first espoused by the publicly released and well-articulated
statement of the Attorney General, could have triggered a

109. Holder Memorandum, supra note 26, at 1–2.
110. United States v. Holcomb, 657 F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 2011) (Easterbook, J.,
concurring) (“[The memorandum] does not explain why partial retroactivity is appropriate—or
why the transition should depend on the date of sentencing, rather than some other event, such
as a guilty plea or an appeal.”).
111. See generally Brief for the United States, supra note 30 (explaining how Congress’s
directive and the structure of the Act dictate application of the new sentencing scheme by the
administrative agency). The Government answered Judge Easterbrook’s questions by
contending that values of finality cautioned against reopening closed cases and that Congress
had only expressed its intent for the new penalties to apply in pending cases. Id. at 48, 53–56.
This argument followed from the Attorney General’s memorandum, where Attorney General
Holder had argued that “Congress intended the [FSA] not only to ‘restore fairness in federal
cocaine sentencing policy’ but to do so as expeditiously as possible and to all defendants
sentenced on or after the enactment date.” Holder Memorandum, supra note 26, at 2. Thus, the
Government’s brief did not advance new arguments or take positions distinct from the Attorney
General’s; it merely elaborated on the arguments already made by the Attorney General.
Accordingly, the Court could have appropriately considered it when performing the Skidmore
analysis.
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presumption of validity.
Had it applied the rule proposed here, the Court would have then
considered whether any one of the factors described above defeated
the presumption of validity. The Court would have determined that
there was voluminous empirical evidence for the Attorney General’s
view that the 100:1 ratio was unsound and should be immediately
112
abandoned. Next, the Court would have noted that the Attorney
General’s memorandum did constitute a change in Justice
Department policy. However, when he issued his memorandum, the
Attorney General himself had not yet addressed the specific issue.
Moreover, the Attorney General’s memorandum came after he had
the opportunity to see how the statutory issues were playing out in
practice, and to hear the public’s responses to such events. Thus, to the
extent that this factor counsels against deference, the Court would
have concluded that it does not, standing alone, defeat the
presumption. Finally, the Court would have noted that, although line
prosecutors had taken the opposing view before the Attorney
General spoke, the Attorney General himself had been unwavering in
his belief that the FSA applied in all post-enactment cases. Ultimately,
as evidenced by the fact that the actual Dorsey Court made the
Government’s legal argument its own, the Court would have
concluded that the Attorney General’s legal position was sound.
Finding that no factor defeated the presumption of validity, the Court
would have deferred to the Attorney General and concluded its
analysis. Instead of leaving lower courts grappling with what
“background principles” should inform their readings of sentencing
provisions, the Court would have adopted and applied a
straightforward deference rule.
IV. CONCLUSION
The obvious retort to this criticism of the Court’s decision in
Dorsey is, “what was the harm?” The Court ultimately made law the
Administration’s lenient, policy-oriented interpretation of the statute.
In fact, the Court did so by following reasoning that was very similar
to the Government’s position. Perhaps the Dorsey Court applied

112. In the memorandum, the Attorney General suggested that this evidence informed his
position. See Holder Memorandum, supra note 26, at 1. In its brief, the Government specifically
cited evidence proving that the old ratio had a discriminatory effect. See Brief for the United
States, supra note 30, at 46 (explaining that, based on the evidence, the heightened sentencing
standards affected offenders discriminatorily).
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deference to the Attorney General without admitting that it was
doing so. If that is the case, why demand that the Court make clear its
implied legal analysis?
Fairness in federal sentencing law demands nothing less. It is less
important that the Dorsey Court ultimately agreed with the
Government than it is that, before it issued its opinion, there was a
very real possibility that the Court would resolve Dorsey in such a
way that a class of individuals would receive prison sentences
significantly longer than either the Administration or Congress
thought were appropriate. In a case where reasonable minds could
and did argue about the relevant legal principles, such an outcome
would have been a stark departure from the value of judicial modesty.
The Dorsey Court’s ultimately agreeing with the Government does
not foreclose the possibility of this unjust and legally dubious
outcome in future cases. The proposed rule, however, does. Without
withdrawing from a sentencing court its ultimate power to impose a
sentence, it would leave for the political branches the power to make
sentencing policy.
The proposed rule would also give lower courts grappling with
ambiguous sentencing provisions a method of resolving such
ambiguities in a way that transcends any single case. Of course,
sentencing courts would not be able to apply the proposed rule in
every case involving an ambiguous sentencing provision. It is perhaps
infrequent that the government and a defendant agree on how best to
construe a sentencing provision. In the majority of cases, a sentencing
court must resolve the disagreement between the government and a
defendant by independently construing the provision. Developing
generally applicable methods to assist a court in doing so is a task for
another day. However, the proposed rule would add consistency and
clarity in at least some cases.
Federal courts’ dockets are crowded. The Bureau of Prisons’s
facilities are even more so. In cases like Dorsey, the Attorney General
offers to alleviate both problems. He is willing to shoulder some of
the work of statutory interpretation that usually is left to a court.
More importantly, he will do so in a way that, consistent with
Congress’s decree, results in individuals entitled to lenient
punishment being sentenced accordingly. When the stakes are so high
and the issues so difficult, what reason can there be for not allowing
the Attorney General to aid courts by providing his own statutory
interpretations? Moreover, what reason can there be for incarcerating

ROSS (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

12/20/2012 2:35 AM

CLARITY AT SENTENCING DEFERRED

109

a prisoner for longer than the politically accountable branches each
believe is appropriate?

